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China’s increasing rise in the world is often juxtaposed against itsmounting domestic problems. On the one hand, China has becomethe second largest economy in the world and a familiar player in the
global economy and politics. On the other hand, more and more attention
has been given to the hidden cost of China’s incredible economic perform-
ance and its impending risks. Not only do critics question the increasing do-
mestic inequalities and environmental degradation, but doubts have been
cast on the sustainability of China’s economic growth and its readiness as
a rising power. What causes the disconnection between China’s international
rise and domestic reality and the conflicting evaluations of China’s devel-
opment? In the following text, I will first discuss the controversies over the
China model – whether it has anything different from existing models and
whether it can be replicated elsewhere. I will then analyse what I see as the
three major components of the China model, if there is one, and the
strengths and weaknesses of each component as well as possible ways of
improvement.
From the Beijing Consensus to the China
model
The “Washington Consensus” is often summarised as privatisation, mar-
ketisation, and liberalisation, the kind of policies endorsed by the IMF, the
World Bank, political and business leaders from developed countries, and
increasingly the elites in developing countries. To some extent, it is a glob-
alised version of the modernisation theory, which proposes that developing
countries have to emulate Western institutions (and abandon their “back-
ward” traditions) in order to catch up with the West in the modern world.
However, unlike the modernisation theory, it focuses on the magic power
of the market institution, and emphasises the importance of participation
in the global market and reduction of trade barriers above all else. Therefore,
critics sometimes call it a kind of “market fundamentalism.” (1) The Wash-
ington Consensus has dominated the discourse on development since the
1980s. However, the neoliberal model captured in the Washington Consen-
sus has not proved to be a true panacea for development but rather a
bumpy road for many developing countries (e.g., in Latin America and sub-
Saharan Africa), and has therefore never lacked criticism and resistance. One
of the challenges to this Western triumphalism has taken place in recent
years, as people have started paying attention to the rise of China, which
has seemingly defied the doctrines of neoliberalism.
The Beijing Consensus was coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo in his book
published by the Foreign Policy Centre in Britain in 2004, and since then
has been widely adopted as a term rivalling the Washington Consensus and
its embedded ideology. (2) Ramo proposes three components of the Beijing
Consensus: a commitment to innovation and constant experimentation, a
measurement of progress beyond GDP per capita that includes sustainability
and even distribution of wealth, and self-determination. Although people
may argue that what Ramo lays out as the cardinal principles of the Beijing
Consensus may be more of an ideal than a description of reality, the Beijing
Consensus reflects frustration with the Washington Consensus and its “one
size fits all” approach and a call for alternatives. Discussion of the Beijing
Consensus has expanded into an intellectual debate over the China model
(Zhongguo moshi) since the recent global recession in 2007, when people
started to question the effectiveness of laissez faire capitalism and contrast
it with China’s economic resilience. 
The controversies over the China model mainly revolve around two ques-
tions: first, does China truly offer an alternative model of development? In
other words, is there anything special about the China model that is not
transitory, and does China prove the modernisation theory wrong? Second,
is the China model applicable to other countries? The first question concerns
mainly the role of the state and the type of state in economic performance
and social management, that is, the market approach vs. the statist ap-
proach and democracy vs. authoritarianism. Among those who believe that
there is something distinctive about the China model, China’s experience is
often labelled as “authoritarian capitalism” (which is different from free
market capitalism and emphasises the importance of state control over the
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economy), (3) “vertical democracy” (which is different from horizontal
democracy or liberal democracy and features the state’s responsibilities to
its people, supervisors’ accountability to their subordinates, and bottom-up
channels of expressing views and filing complaints), (4) or “capitalism or so-
cialism with Chinese characteristics” (which points to the hybridity of
China’s development in deviating from both prototypical capitalism and
socialism). Some further see China as representing a new paradigm of
modernity and a non-capitalist market economy that can counterbalance
Western modernity and power. (5)
For those who do not think that China offers any alternatives, some argue
that China has landed on a path not that different from the neoliberal
model, which is largely based on the exploitation of its vast pool of cheap
labour, attracting foreign investment, and an increasingly liberalised econ-
omy, (6) even though the process of this transition towards the “Washington
Consensus” may take on some Chinese characteristics such as its gradual-
ism, a disinterested state insulated from special interests, and institutional
adaptation, all of which help mobilise broad public support for reforms. (7)
Others, while recognising, China’s deviation from a free market economy,
see the statist approach coupled with limited political reform as transitory
or unsustainable. Yasheng Huang, for example, argues in his book Capitalism
with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State that ordinary
Chinese citizens, especially the rural population, benefitted more from the
country’s economic growth in the 1980s, when policies were more liber-
alised and entrepreneurship boomed, while personal incomes stagnated
compared to the double-digit GDP growth rate in the 1990s during Jiang
Zemin’s regime, when the government was more hands-on and entrepre-
neurship was suppressed. (8) In other words, people led a better life when
China was following the “Washington Consensus” than it was when the “Bei-
jing Consensus” took over that the state advanced and the private sector
retreated (guojin mintui). 
Both proponents and opponents of the China model as an alternative
path of development seem to miss the target when they look at China’s
development as a national strategy without taking into account the in-
ternational dimension, given that the two are interconnected and inter-
twined. Yasheng Huang, for example, ignores the fact that there are
different priorities in various historical periods of development; in other
words, policy and policy effects are not linear but are conditioned by the
historical and geopolitical context. When reform first started under Deng
Xiaoping, because of the sharp contrast with the old system, long-sup-
pressed entrepreneurship was released, and any institutional change could
lead to a huge increase in personal income. As the economy has grown,
new problems and challenges have emerged. In addition to raising people’s
standard of living, there are the issues of increasing national competitive-
ness and establishing long-term strategies for development. China’s role
in the global society is also constantly shifting. It was during Jiang Zemin’s
regime that China ended trade negotiations with Western countries and
entered the World Trade Organisation. In that sense, it was probably not
because the state was more hands-on that personal incomes – especially
rural incomes – stagnated, but because China was further tied into the
neo-liberal capitalist world system as the “workshop of the world” and
turned away from building social welfare. Huang’s own data indicate a
bounce-back of personal incomes and other welfare indicators in the Hu-
Wen administration since 2002, but it is difficult to conclude whether this
is a result of a return to a more liberal policy framework or of better social
support. (9)
The argument that China’s success exemplifies neoliberal development
strategies echoes discussion over the East Asian Newly Industrialising
Countries in the 1980s and 1990s, when the success of the “Asian Tigers”
was likewise seen as the product of their export-orientation and liber-
alised economies. (10) However, such a view was soon disputed by the in-
dispensable role of the developmental state in facilitating economic
growth. (11) Therefore, in order to better understand China’s development
one should look at Chinese society and its relation to the world as dy-
namic and intertwined rather than static and separated. It is also impor-
tant to end the dichotomous view of the market and the state, because
the economy is embedded in the social. (12) As indicated in the vast
amount of literature on the varieties of capitalism comparing American
capitalism with the German, Japanese, and Scandinavian versions, capi-
talism itself is structured by economies, cultures, and polities, and further
constrained by historical institutions. (13) Although modernisation and
globalisation are often considered forces that drive out alternative ver-
sions of capitalism as highly mobile capital renders it difficult to enforce
pro-labour policies or expand welfare programs, variants across time and
space abound. 
The second field of contention is whether China’s experience can be ex-
ported to other countries. After all, not all developing countries have strong
governments with the capacity and autonomy to govern (i.e., maintaining
social stability, carrying out policies with relative independence and legiti-
macy, and providing the infrastructure and social services necessary for eco-
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nomic development) (14) and a population as large, flexible, and skilled as
China’s. The scale of its population creates a potential internal market and
a large pool of labour; its long history of state bureaucracy and three
decades of socialist programs have laid the foundation for a strong state. If
China’s development has to fit its own national conditions and historical
and geopolitical context, it is the same for other developing countries. Prob-
lems underlying the Washington Consensus are not going to be solved by
replacing one prescription with another, but rather by allowing for diverse
ways of development. 
In addition, critics of the Beijing Consensus are right in pointing out that
development policies in China are often not made out of a consensus
among Chinese intellectuals, elites, and government officials but are com-
promises between leftist and rightist factions and different levels of admin-
istration. (15) In other words, to view China as a monolith oversimplifies the
complexity and reality of its development and overlooks variations at both
the central and local levels. Nonetheless, while China’s national conditions
cannot be replicated elsewhere, the experience of finding a suitable path of
development can be shared, and that often means to find a balance be-
tween a country’s global standing and its domestic reality, between the
state and the market. 
China’s rise has certainly led to more reflection on and scepticism about
whether Western modernity and liberal democracy epitomise the ultimate
goal of development. Once again the trajectory of human history has be-
come open-ended, and in contrast with the claim of “the end of history” by
Francis Fukuyama, (16) the search for the end result of development as well
as the proper economic, political, and social institutions leading to that out-
come continues. Within this larger context, the significance of the discussion
or debate about a China model does not lie in whether the model per se is
mature or complete or whether it will replace the Western paradigm; rather,
it indicates that there is not a universal “best” path of development, or a
singular end result. Different forms and logics of economic, social, and po-
litical organisation can co-exist, and the China model is but one of them.
Against the neoliberal ideal type, the contradictions underlying the Chi-
nese experience of development are: economic growth without privatisa-
tion; effectiveness of both market and hierarchical bureaucracy; and the
existence of pluralistic interests managed by an authoritarian state. There-
fore, in the following section, I will discuss these three contradictions, which
I see as the three features of the China model, and analyse how China works
or fails to reconcile its international rise and domestic problems along these
three dimensions.
Mixed ownership – Protection of rights
without privatisation
One area that defines China’s gradualist reform in contrast to the “shock
therapy” adopted by the former Soviet Union and East European countries
is its mixed economy, which combines state and non-state sectors and dif-
ferent forms of ownership (including state, collective, joint ventures, private,
and foreign), and is labelled by the Chinese state as the socialist market
economy. China’s experience therefore contradicts the neoliberal belief in
privatisation as the prerequisite for development. The co-existence of state
and non-state sectors buys time for reform of the public sector. Meanwhile,
the growth of non-state sectors forces the state sector to become more ef-
ficient and competitive while buffering the “shock” created by restructuring
the state sector.
China’s land ownership is fundamentally public, with land owned by the
state in urban areas and by collectives in the countryside. However, own-
ership includes a bundle of separate rights such as the right of control, the
right to income, and the right of transfer, (17) which gives rise to hybrid forms
of ownership that transcend the dichotomy between private and public. A
two-tiered land tenure system has been established in China since its re-
forms in the late 1970s with the separation of public land ownership and
private user rights. In rural areas, for example, a bundle of property rights
has been transferred to peasants through the Household Contract Respon-
sibility System (jiating chengbao zeren zhi). Each peasant household is al-
located plots of land based on the size of the household, women and men
alike. The lease term for arable land has to be renewed every 30 years to
account for changing demographics and landscape in the village and to en-
sure an equal distribution of land to each household. Households can use
the land, decide what to grow on the land, reap its harvest, and sell the sur-
plus on the market, and compensation is received if their land needs to be
expropriated for some other purpose before the end of tenancy. However,
they cannot individually sell or buy land or borrow against it as a mortgage
for cash to invest in tools, machinery, or other products, although they may
transfer, sublease, or exchange land use rights during their contracted period.
In addition, contracted land cannot be used for non-agricultural purposes.
In urban areas, homeowners receive 70 years of residency rights when they
purchase houses or apartments on the commercial housing market. In sum,
individuals and households in both rural and urban areas only participate
in the second-tier land rental market, while it is the state and rural collec-
tives that operate in the first-tier land sales market. The ownership structure
in China can thus be understood as protection of property rights without
privatisation. 
The collective ownership of rural land is partly to prevent land from be-
coming concentrated in a few hands and to provide peasants with the
means of basic subsistence so that even if they leave for the cities to seek
non-farming jobs they still have the land for recourse. It is further suggested
that compared with a complete land privatisation, village cooperatives can
help peasant households bargain for credit, negotiate terms when a third
party wants to lease and consolidate land, and provide public investment
and services necessary for agricultural development. (18) Nonetheless, land
disputes have increased in recent years, mostly because peasants are often
undercompensated, if at all, when their land is expropriated by the local
government or private real estate developers backed by local officials, as
land has become increasingly precious and scarce with three decades of in-
dustrialisation and urbanisation. The local states, the supposed guardians of
the land, have essentially become the largest landlords that profit from sell-
ing or leasing land for commercial use, which often involves corruption and
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collusion, whereas a lack of due process deprives peasants of a fair share of
the yields and a sustained source of income. Surging housing prices in major
cities and increasing cases of demolition for urban development have also
led to anxiety and insecurity among the urban population. The contradiction
thus arises between private rights formed in the market economy and the
socialist ideology of public ownership and egalitarianism. It should be noted
that the severity of land grabs varies across regions. In some villages where
rural collectives are still functioning, for example, land is not sold to third
parties but is collectively utilised in the form of collective (farming or non-
farming) enterprises, and each villager receives a continuous supply of in-
come and benefits from this. (19)
Recognising the importance and urgency of issues related to peasants and
agriculture, for nine consecutive years from 2004-2012 during Hu Jintao’s
administration, the No. 1 central document jointly issued by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and the State Council had fo-
cused on rural and agricultural issues, and the “construction of a new so-
cialist countryside” (jianshe shehui zhuyi xin nongcun) campaign was
launched in October 2005. (20) This signalled a discursive change from the
1990s, when the urban bias in development was stronger, and the docu-
ments touched upon aspects of rural investment, financial access, protection
of land rights, technological and social services, etc.
Although publicly-owned land can prevent the creation of landless peas-
ants and urban slums as well as the concentration of land in a few hands
seen in many other developing countries, it also raises the issue of moni-
toring power and the avoidance of rent-seeking and profiteering activities
by bureaucrats and their protégés. Without changing the current ownership
structure, protection of private property was written into the Constitution
in 2004 and reinforced in the first property rights law passed in 2007, which
states that the property of the state, the collective, and the individual are
all equally protected. The law also aims to protect individuals against illegal
land and property seizures, although it still lacks specific standards or re-
quirements to ensure a just and fair purpose and process for such expropri-
ations. (21) Therefore, more specificities are needed in the legal institution in
order to improve the mixed ownership structure in China. In addition, more
transparency in local governments’ revenue and budgets may also limit the
abuse of power and land grabs.
In terms of business ownership, China has formed a mixed economy con-
sisting of the state, private, and foreign-invested sectors with often inter-
twining and complex ownership structures. Dieter Ernst and Barry Naughton
describe it as a three-tier enterprise system including large, central-govern-
ment firms; hybrid local and foreign firms; and small-scale capitalism. (22) Al-
though foreign direct investment and the private sector play important roles
in China’s economy, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (23) still dominate the
strategic sectors and industries such as banking, energy, telecommunica-
tions, and transportation. Moreover, they have become major players in the
global market when China invests in other parts of the world. 
Nonetheless, the business expansion of SOEs into foreign markets is often
politicised, as it is not considered to be merely business transactions, but
as representing China’s national interests and the Chinese government’s
long-reaching arm. Because foreign countries feel that it is difficult to sep-
arate the state sector from the private sector in China, they tend to be wary
of mergers and acquisitions involving Chinese SOEs or, for that matter, any
Chinese firms, and even directly block such deals. (24) A mixed economy with
a vibrant state sector is therefore a double-edged sword: on the one hand,
it provides the Chinese government with more leverage to stabilise the
economy during times of crisis (for example, by providing employment op-
portunities, controlling prices of major commodities and factor inputs, safe-
guarding provisions of infrastructure, and stimulating domestic demand
through public investment or lending) and raises Chinese firms’ global com-
petitiveness; on the other hand, it may cause resistance from the private
sector both at home and abroad and from foreign governments and legis-
lators, as they see competition with Chinese firms as unfair or threatening
to national security. However, as the advanced capitalist countries are mired
in economic recessions, the need for capital sometimes trumps political
concerns and allows Chinese companies to become familiar players in global
takeovers. (25) The role of Chinese firms, including SOEs, in the global market
is therefore dynamically related to both China’s national policies and the
global context. Studies of China’s trade with Africa also indicate that its
strategy abroad is often an externalisation of its own modernisation expe-
riences and reflective of its domestic development contradictions and pri-
orities. (26)
In sum, China has gradually evolved into a mixed economy with a hybrid
property ownership structure that allows for the co-existence of state and
non-state sectors and public and private property rights. While some may
argue that the private sector is the real star in China’s miracle growth, schol-
ars have also pointed out that what makes China distinctive is its reasonably
efficient state sector, which has been made more or less competitive and
profit-oriented. (27)I would further argue that it is neither the private sector
nor the state sector alone but the hybridity that provides China with flexi-
bility during times of crisis and the possibility of investing in public goods
and raising its international competitiveness. However, just as the dosage
of hybridity has been shifting in the past, it is bound to transform in the fu-
ture. Two of the challenges ahead are: protection of people from land grabs
by the state and its agents as urbanisation and industrialisation deepen; and
the legitimacy of SOEs as they are nominally owned by the whole people
(quanmin suoyou) but are often essentially trade oligopolies that benefit
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their executives and employees at the expense of other citizens. Both prob-
lems concern the system of oversight. The first may be mitigated if there
are more specificities in the property rights law to cover the details of land
appropriation and compensation and if there is more transparency in local
governments’ budgets and revenue. The latter is the challenge of competing
goals for the SOEs as they are expected to compete in the market and at
the same time fulfil their social missions. One way of meeting this challenge
may be through enhancing the state’s role as the majority holder of the
SOEs and sharing the profits with the general population through specifi-
cally designated government transfers into welfare programs such as public
housing, public education, poverty alleviation, and health care.
The role of the (local) state –
Decentralisation and local institutional
innovations
One does not have to be a China specialist to note the difference between
free market capitalism and China’s development strategies. Of course, we
also need to be aware that the free market is never free; the fulfilment of a
free market economy needs protection from various institutions, including
but not limited to the state and legal institutions, so there probably has
never been a truly free market. 
In China, the authoritarian state is often seen as the visible hand driving
the Chinese economy; how to reconcile market with bureaucratic hierar-
chy therefore seems to be another contradiction in China’s development.
I argue, however, that it is not the centralisation of power but decentral-
isation of power that gives the Chinese economy its vitality. The Chinese
state is not a monolith, but allows for local variations and innovations
such as what Jean Oi calls “local state corporatism” (28) or Kellee Tsai calls
“adaptive informal institutions.” (29) Institutional innovations at the grass-
roots level are sometimes incorporated into the formal institutions after
they prove effective, leading to incremental changes and reforms in the
economic and political spheres. Therefore, if there is a China model, it cer-
tainly is not just one model but is composed of many different local mod-
els. There are, for example, the more entrepreneurial Shenzhen and
Wenzhou models, but also the more state-controlled Shanghai and South-
ern Jiangsu models. Even in Wenzhou, in addition to booming household
businesses, there are still places where collective enterprises thrive. For
example, in Shangyuan Village in Yueqing County, land is pooled together
and turned into a shareholding land cooperative in which each villager
gets dividends from the rent generated by collectively-owned commercial
clusters. The collective component of the economy therefore offers a
safety net to the village’s household businesses as they compete in the
market. (30) So let a thousand flowers bloom but also let the flowers cross-
pollinate – such is an exploring and mutual learning process. The central
state, meanwhile, plays the role of macro-controlling the roadmap of de-
velopment and setting guidelines. 
Local variations and institutional innovations at the grassroots provide the
Chinese economy with much flexibility. As the more export-oriented Pearl
River Delta in southern China was hit by reduced foreign demand during
the economic recession, the more endogenous Zhejiang could keep its mo-
mentum as it relied more on local capital and the domestic market. Within
the Pearl River Delta, Shenzhen, one of the first special economic zones in
China, is actively striving to upgrade its businesses and technologies away
from basic manufacturing to more value-added production and services;
businesses such as BYD, Huawei, and Tencent have become champions in
its industrial restructuring. (31) As a result, many assembly plants have moved
to Dongguan, Huizhou, and other parts of the Delta, and some have even
relocated to the hinterland to take advantage of its abundance of cheaper
labour. Cities in the Yangtze River Delta such as Suzhou and Wuxi rejected
low-technology and heavily polluting industries from the very beginning
when they started to attract foreign investment, and the governments there
were more hands-on in development planning compared to the Pearl River
Delta.
Decentralisation, at the same time, is not without cost. Competition
among local governments can lead to local protectionism and excess ca-
pacity or wasteful investment as they rush to invest in or subsidise similar
projects, e.g., steel, cement, solar panels, wind power, or infrastructure such
as subways and highways. This does imply that local cadres have strong in-
centives to be growth-oriented and work on the economic performance of
their area – one of the reasons why China has maintained its economic
growth despite corruption – but it also indicates the lack of coordination
and due process in government investment. The balance of local autonomy
and central control and of market and bureaucracy is a tricky one, and it
requires constant adaptation and adjustment based on the changing polit-
ical and economic context. Introducing an expanded incentive system for
cadres beyond immediate economic growth to include things such as en-
vironmental protection, social welfare provisions, and a healthy economic
structure is perhaps one of the first steps. 
Democracy, Chinese style – The continuing
search for legitimacy
Whether there is or can be Chinese-style democracy is perhaps the biggest
question mark and the most controversial element in the Chinese model of
development. The contradiction lies in the increasingly pluralistic interests
in Chinese society and its single-party system. Some people argue that
China has adopted all of the Weberian “modern” institutions but participa-
tory democracy, so it is simply a matter of time before China will become
democratised like its East Asian neighbours. In their recent book Why Na-
tions Fail, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson propose that differences in
economic performance lie in countries’ political and economic institutions,
and that “inclusive” political institutions, as opposed to “extractive ones,”
lead to “inclusive” economic institutions and thus to economic success. Fol-
lowing that account, they argue that China’s combination of economic
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growth and political control cannot last long. (32) Others see China as a
prominent example of “authoritarian resilience.” Whether authoritarianism
is transitory or permanent, understanding China or the China Model requires
more studies on democracy and authoritarianism beyond their prototypes
as well as their relationship to development, which is far more complex
than the linear model described by Acemoglu and Robinson.
As Fukuyama points out, modern liberal democracy is a combination of
three sets of institutions – the state, the rule of law, and the mechanisms
of accountability exemplified in the multiparty electoral system. But as
much as we may know about different forms of democracy, we know sur-
prisingly little about the variety of authoritarianism and factors affecting
the quality of the state beyond the prototype of liberal democracy. For ex-
ample, accountability is often equated with procedural accountability
achieved through the multiparty electoral system, but in countries such as
China there has been a long history of moral accountability rather than pro-
cedural accountability and a better-developed bureaucratic state than the
rule of law. (33) Among China’s Asian neighbours, Japan and the “Asian Tigers”
all had periods of authoritarianism accompanied by a high rate of economic
growth, and even after their democratisation, the democratic institutions
work differently from their counterparts in the West. In Singapore, for ex-
ample, there are elections, but one party (People’s Action Party) always wins.
In India, multi-party democracy has not been able to curb increasing social
inequalities and the hijacking of the state by big businesses and new
elites. (34) In other words, state autonomy and capacity is often more im-
portant than the formality of democracy, and even when democratic insti-
tutions are in place they are not necessarily effective. China’s experience of
development challenges students of governance to further think about the
measurement of state performance with questions like: can a certain level
of authoritarianism be tolerated if economic growth accompanies it; is
benevolent authoritarianism (development-oriented and representing a
broad base of interests) better than a bad democracy (one form of which
could be a vetocracy unable to make decisions or implement critical
changes due to partisan politics); do elections and a multiparty system guar-
antee democracy (i.e., the procedural, constitutional, process-oriented, and
substantive approaches to democracy)? (35)
It has now become almost a cliché to say that China’s economic reforms
are more radical than its political reforms, but at the same time one should
not overlook the incremental political change underlying the one-party
system. As Suisheng Zhao argues, it is important to simultaneously revisit
the extent of the free market and the extent of authoritarianism in the
China model. (36) Of course, exactly how authoritarian or democratic China
is depends on the benchmark used – whether it is compared to the dem-
ocratic ideal, its own historical past, or other authoritarian and democratic
states. The CCP has increasingly institutionalised its merit-based recruit-
ment (including civil service exams and elections at local levels) and pro-
motion (based on the performance in leading the local economy among
other things), leadership tenure and succession (including mandatory re-
tirement), etc., and has strengthened its governing capacity to be more re-
sponsive to public opinion. (37) At the same time, it has also been able to
learn from the successes and failures of other regimes. (38) It is perhaps one
of the most flexible, resilient, and pragmatic political parties: it endured
the collapse of the Soviet Union and adopted a “socialist market economy”
to resume its legitimacy as the leader of economic growth; it co-opted pri-
vate entrepreneurs and social elites into the Party when market reforms
brought about a vibrant private sector and rising middle classes and trans-
formed itself from a revolutionary party into an elite party. Now it has
started to turn from growth at all cost to “building a harmonious society”
as a result of increasing social injustices and people’s pent-up dissatisfac-
tion with corruption and inequality. The CCP seems to always incorporate
the most critical and urgent demands made by the citizens into its policies
and discourses to sustain its legitimacy as the ruling party. As a result, while
repressive in aspects such as the control of information and suppression
of protests and political dissent, the CCP is responsive to some popular de-
mands and does not take its legitimacy for granted. Being selectively au-
thoritarian and selectively responsive and accountable sustains the one
party state in China.
But how sustainable is authoritarianism, Chinese style? The lack of proce-
dural legitimacy has been replaced so far by performance-based legitimacy
and a relatively broad base of social support, but neither is guaranteed for
the future. First, although economic development needs a strong state to
provide social and political order and implement cohesive policies, it also
creates more diverse interests in society. At the same time, the very coop-
tation that expands the social base of the CCP may eventually undermine
its ideological foundation and organisational cohesiveness. Second, although
an economic recession is a challenge to any political system, in the Chinese
system, unlike in a multiparty electoral system, if performance becomes
unsatisfactory or the image and values that the state has been trying hard
to create no longer resonate with the general population, there are no in-
stitutionalised alternatives to buffer the shock. That is probably why “sta-
bility” has become such a buzzword for the CCP in addition to maintaining
economic performance.
It remains to be seen whether democracy can be achieved through self-
reflection and reform within one party – what the CCP proposes as intra-
party democracy. After all, this kind of democracy would require the sole
ruling party to have self-control, allow free speech, and constantly absorb
new forces while transcending elite interests. In the current phase, the In-
ternet and social media seem to offer a new space for people to monitor
the state and cadres, expose cases of corruption, and express dissatisfac-
tion, providing the state with informal feedback outside the traditional
channels of political consultation with non-CCP parties, small-group
meetings for CCP members, public hearings, the petition system, and so-
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licitation of public-opinion. However, if the CCP continues to be obsessed
with stability and order instead of learning to live with and accept differ-
ences, the Internet will become more of a monitoring tool than a democ-
ratising mechanism for the state. Whether it is intra-party democracy or
inter-party democracy, checks and balances need to be institutionalised,
albeit not necessarily through the same institutions as in Western models.
Otherwise, state governance can easily fall into the “bad emperor” trap
with a reckless rent-seeking government, and the only hope is for the next
“good emperor.” The newly inaugurated Xi Jinping administration seems
to be trying hard to combine the various goals of the Chinese state into
what Xi calls the “China Dream” (Zhongguo meng), which is at once pop-
ulist (e.g., focusing on popular concerns over corruption, food safety, smog,
health and social security, etc.), nationalist (e.g., emphasising the great
revival of the Chinese nation [zhonghua minzu de weida fuxing] and mil-
itary strength), authoritarian (e.g., banning discussions of “constitutional
rule” [xianzheng] and reassuring the public that the China Dream can best
be achieved under the leadership of the CCP through socialism), and liberal
(e.g., the pursuit of personal success and happiness and the further deep-
ening of reforms).
Conclusion
In the previous sections, I discuss the controversies over the China model
– how distinctive it is and whether it is applicable to other countries. There
are no definite answers to either question. The contradictions people see in
China’s experience of development, however, are at the same time its dis-
tinctiveness: economic growth without privatisation, effectiveness of both
market and hierarchical bureaucracy, and the existence of pluralistic inter-
ests managed by an authoritarian state. 
Regardless of whether or not it is too early to talk about a China model,
China’s national conditions dictate that it has to follow a path different
from the neoliberal one. There are simply not enough resources on earth to
support 1.3 billion people in a lifestyle similar to that of people in developed
countries. The newly rich and the emerging middle classes in China have al-
ready shocked the world with their appetite for consumer products, energy,
and food. Meanwhile, the sheer size of the population ensures that no prob-
lem is a small one, even if it involves only a tiny fraction of the population. 
As China has become the world’s second largest economy, it has reached
a crossroads: if it can hold on to its accumulated advantages, reflect on the
social and ecological costs associated with its economic growth (such as
environmental degradation, food security issue, polarised income gap, work-
ers’ and migrant workers’ declining welfare, and increasingly unaffordable
housing, education, and health care) and avoid the pitfalls of neoliberalism,
then a real China model may be formed; otherwise, as problems accumulate,
it may reach a point of no return. Avoiding this will require continued ex-
ploration of mixed ownership, the role of the state, including the local state,
and Chinese-style democracy to cope with new problems down the road.
The value of the debate over the China model lies not in how perfect it is
or whether it will replace existing models, but in the possibility of effective
alternatives to neoliberal models of development. Further studies are nec-
essary on China’s specific policies at different historical periods and how
they interlink with the global context at that particular time. 
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